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M£ly]!)-t;,! INTAGLJA']',\ t'. SlIlI'OWNERS & MER, ETC. CO. ::lGG 
[26 C,2d 365; 159 P.2d 1) 
[So F. No. 17]02. In Bank. May 2.5, 1945.] 
JOE I?\'l'AGLIATA, Respondellt, V. SHIPOWNBRS & MER-
ClIA!,\'l'S TO\\'BOA 'Ii COMPANY, LTD. (a Corpora-
tion), Appellant. 
[1 a, 1 b) Sbip ping-Collisions-Def enses-Contributory Negligence. 
-Thp right of a plaintiff to a division of damages in a mari-
timf' collision case involving the fault of hoth. parties· is an. 
essf'ntial ff'ature of the substantial law of admiralty, is inher-
ent in his cause of action, and must be recognized in a state 
conrt; hence the doctrine of contributory negligence is not a 
opfensp to such action. 
[2] rd,-Law Governing.-Thl' general rules of the maritime law 
apply whether a proceeding involving a maritime cause of 
artion be instituted in an admiralty or common-law court, 
find thl:' state courts mnst preserve all substantial admiralty 
rig-hts of the litigants. A state court having the same juris-
dietion over a case that a federal court would have if the suit 
had been hrought there, must determine the rights at the 
partieR under the maritime law. 
[3] Conflict of Laws - Torts-Defenses-Contributory Negligence. 
-The eff('ct of contributory negligence of a plaintiff is gov-
erned by the law under which the cause otaction was acquired 
rather than by the law of the forum, 
[4) Shipping-Collisions-Law Goveming.-In a maritime colli-
sion case, federal law governs not only the consequences of 
tIll' fault of both parties. but also the question whether their 
vessels were operated in compliance with the rules governing 
navi<;ation on navigable waters of the United States. The 
Federal Inland Rules of Navigation (30 Stats. 96-102; 33 
U.S,C.A. §§ 151-231) are controlling except as they permit the 
application of special local law. 
[5] Id. - Collisions - Special Circnmsta.nces - Departure from 
Rules. - A case of "special circumstances" requiring action 
outside the Federal Inland Rules of Navigation (art. 27, 30 
Stats 102; 33 U.S.C.A. § 212) exists if the danger of a colli-
[1] See 23 Oal.Jur. 372; 48 Am.Jur. 160. 
[3] Conflict of laws as to contributory Degligenee, Dote, 32 
A.L.R. 796. See, also, 11 Am.Jur. 503. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 11-16] Shipping, § 30; [2] Shipping, 
§3; (3) Conflict of Laws, §13j [4-9) Shipping, 121; [10] Trial, 
§149. 
Mr. INTAGLIATA t', ~11TPo\YNRnS &. ~fJ:Jl. F.TC. CO. f~G ('.~d 
sion is nl:tniff'~t to the lIflpfltin of tllf' Vf'~;s('l f"rp(l with th0 
problrm of nrpnrtinc: from tlir r111(><. 
[6] Id.-ColJisions---Vessels Crossin~-Rules Governing. - A cnr 
float ann a tug towinc: it in inlAnd wfliers W(,),0 pridlCg'rd 
v('sst'ls when· thry W0r0 on tIl(> sinrhoarn si,l(· of an appronch-
in!? fishing bont. ann thpy hlld a dllt~, undl'l' thl' Fprlcrnl Inland 
R11les to hold th"ir ('nllrS0 Il.nd S)(,(,(l, ",hill' it wa;; thr.dut:-· of 
t.he owner of flip {i··hing hont to kN'T' out of thrir \\'nv. (.'30 
S1 ats. ] 0]: 'l'l 1l.S.C.A. ~~ 204. 20r,. 207. 2()f;. \ 
[7] Id.-Collisions-Towing Vessek-Lookout.-Th<, captain of a 
tug towing a car float on tilt' starhoard side of an apPJ'oaeh-
ing fishing boat. which gav£> inilirations of being in distr£>ss 
and which failed to change hpr conrsp or to answer the tUg's 
signal that the latter was going to ('hangoe her course, should 
haH' exercised particular cantion, lind such tug did not comply 
with the Fen<'ral Inland Rule regardinc: th£> maintenance of 
a spC'cial lookout, simply h£>cansp t.hp offi!,pr in charge looked 
011t from thr pilot h011S,.. 
[8] ld. - Collisions - Towing Vessel - Lookout. - Although ordi-
narily it is the duty of the other ship to make allowance for 
the encl1mbered stllte of a tug. tl)(' ('aptain of a tug with a 
barge in tow must ~ve considpration to the special dang£>r 
conn£>ct('d with such a tuc: in deciding whether the situation 
created by the approach of thp other Rhip is RO dangoerous that 
h£> should stop th£> tug'. 
[9] Id. - Oollisions - Duty of One Vessel Notwithstanding Fault 
of Other.-In case of a collision. even though one vessel is 
grossly at fault. a plain fanlt on the part of the other vessel is 
not excus£>d. The "major and minor fault rule"-that is, 
where one vrssel is guilty of gros~ fault, the other is presumed 
not to have been in fault-is superseded by the' rule that if OIle 
vessel, though correctly navic:atpn 80mp timp before the colli-
sion. can perceive that a dangerous situation is developing 
through mismanagement ()f 1I110ther v('ssel, it becomes her dllty 
with all meflilS at hpr di~pos:ll to prevent th£> accident and. 
notwithstanding th£> fault of th£> other vess£>l, to use such pre-
cautions as good judgment and aCl'omplished seamanship 
require. 
[10] Trial- Instructions - Oonfusing Instructions.-Instructions 
on hypothetical facts not supported by the evidence tend to 
confuse the jury. 
[11) Shipping-Collisions-Instructions. - In an action for dam-. 
[9] See 48 Am.Jur. 155. 
) 
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ages to plaintiff's fishillg bout colliding- witll defendant's car 
110nt to\\"(><1 by II tug: in inlnnd waf(>r~, an instruction that a 
lookollt Illllst he ~tntioneo at Il particular. place on the> tow 
illYlln"n 1 he province- of the- .inr:>. thc rule being thl1t the> look-
out !IInst be in a "position bl'st Ilrlapted to descry vessf'ls ap-
proarhinc>:at thf' pnrlif'st momf'nt." (Art. 29, :lO Stat.s.l02: 
:i:l U.S.C.:\.. ~ 221.) 
[121 Id.-Collisions-Instructions. - 111 all udioll fOT damug('s to 
plajn(iff~ fisllin~ bon! (>olljdin,~ with df'fl'ndant's car float 
(o\Y I' ,] by a tug ill inllmrl waters, a formula instruction with 
)"f's]>C'ct to the (>Jie>ct of the disl1hlf'd l'onc1ition of plaintiff's 
"f'ss!'1 was not erroneous in omitting the element of contribu-
tory negligencl', but was incompletc in omitting" any reference 
to plnintiff's duty to indicate thr disnblf'f] stntlls of his vessf'1 
by giving nrlllger or otl)('1" distress signals. 
[13] Id.-Collisions-Instructions. - In an action for damag-es to 
plaintiff's fishing boat collirling with defpndant's ear float 
towrd b~> a tug in inland watrrs, an indrllction B1' to thp duty 
of thc pe>rsoll 'in charg'(> of earh \'essf'l to rpnder such aid as 
may be '"requisitr" was incomplete in omitting the statutory 
word "practicable," and also in omitting the condition, "in 
the n bsrnce of proof to the contrAry." (Sre 26 Stats. 425; 
33 U.S.C.A. § ::167.) 
[14) Id.-Collisions-Instructions. -In an action for damages to 
plaintiff's fishing boat eolliding with defendant's ear float 
towen by a tug in inland waters, it was error to give an in-
struction that the fact that a tug is burnened with a heavy 
and unwieldy tow ilJ1pose~ on the tug the duty of taking 
extraordinary care to keep her tow out of the way of other 
vessels, a" between vessels otherwise equal a tug with a tow 
has thr right of way over a vesspl without a tow. 
[15] Id.-Collisions-Instructions. - In an action for damages to 
plaintiffs fishing boat colliding with nefrndant's ear float 
towed by a tug in inland waters, it was prejudicial error to ilJ, 
struct the .iur~· in terms of both thr Cnlifornia Harbors and 
Navigation Cod(> and the Federal Inland Rules with regard to 
the proprr connuct of vessels approaching on crossing courses, 
since the instructions were confticting-, and the federal rules 
are paramount. 
[16] Id.-Collisions-Instructions. - In an action for damages to 
plaintiff's fishing boat colliding with defendant's car float 
towed by a tug in inland watrrs, an instruction on the appli-
cable fpdpral rules was incornplrte where the conrt failed to 
give an instruetion that the tug had to maintain hrr course 
and speed unt~l the danger of collision became manifest and 
) 
3G8 
was then under a duty to tal:r all rrasonal)]r action to prevrnt 
a collision, the pivotn 1 qllrstion in the case being" w}lcthrr thp 
captain of th(' tug ShOll],l havr stopped and reYrl'sro it or 
changrrl his course in time to prevent an otherwise inevitahl!' 
collision .. 
. APPEAJJ from n judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco nnd from an order deny-
ing a new trial. Frnnk T. Deasy, Judge. Judgment reversed; 
appeal from order dismissed. 
Action for damages resulting from a collision of watercraft. 
Judgment for plaintiff reversed. 
Derby, Sharp, Quinby & Tweedt for Appellant. 
Andersen & Resner, George R. Andersen and Herbert Res-
ner for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff brought this action for damages 
for the harm to his fishing boat "San Giuseppe" resulting 
from a collision with a car float bearing thirteen railroad car~: 
towed by defendant's tug "Sea Rover." The action was tried 
before a jury. Defendant appeals from a judgment awarding 
plaintiff $2,000 damages and from an order denying a motion 
for a new trial. 
Plaintiff left Fish"rman's Wharf in San Francisco alone 
in his fishing boat about 4 :30 a.m., half an hour before tho 
collision, and proceeded in a west€'rly direction. The boal 
displayed running lights. Since the night was clear there wa~; 
good visibility, and an ebb tide favored plaintiff's movement. 
About ten minutes after leaving Fisherman's Wharf, plaill 
tiff stopped his engine because of air in the fuel line. He 
testified that before working on the engine he looked aroun(l 
to see whether any other craft were in sight; that he did not 
see defendant's tug and car float; that he worked to clear the 
fuel line for about five or six minutes and then started the 
engine; that he then saw the car float 25 to 30 feet away and 
crashed into her bow because he could not change his cours(' 
effectively at that distance. He claims that he heard no warn-
ing whistles and that when he caned for help, as his boat was 
the assistance of another fishing boat plaintiff's boat reached 
getting away from the car float under its own power, he re-




the entrance of Pishel'man's Wharf where it sank. It was 
subsequently rnis('(l and repaired. 
Captain Rdwa]'(ls of df'fcndant's tug "Sea Rover" testified 
t.hat he left Tihuron nhollt 4 :10 a.m. bound for Pier 45, San 
Francisco. pro('c!'c1in;! g(,lJcr:lll~' east h~' south; tliltt he was .; 
standing on 1h(' tll~.(S pilot hom;!' wll('J'(' he hnd an unoh-
structrc1 vicw; that he oh.c;rrvc·o plnint.ifi·~ borit nnd another 
fi~hing boat as the~' ('lrarro Pi!'r 4:i and came into the ha~'; 
and that hr ('ontinurrl to wat('h the t.wo hoats until the colli-
sion oc('urred. Accordin/! to Captain Ec1wards, the collision 
occurred about a quarter of a mile from Aquatic Park; plain-
tiff fixed hat ahout 250 ~'ar<1s from the Yacht Rnrbor. Cap-
tain Edwards also testified that he blew onr whistle when 
he was ahouta·quarter of a mile from plaintiff's boat to indio 
cate that he was going to chan/!ehis course to the right in 
order to pass plaintiff on t.he port side; t.hat since plaintiff 
did not answer or change his course. he gave the danger sitmal. 
a series of short blasts; and that when plaintiff continued on 
on his course he' gave the orrler to stop and reverse the tug 
so that the car float was at a standstill when plaintiff's vessel 
crashed into it. After the collision he called to plaintiff but 
received no answer from him. although the other fisherrnall 
who was near plaintiff's hoat ('nlJed back that he would try 
to ascertain plnintiff'~ condition. Captain Edwards testified 
. that he did not sec that onr fishing- boat left in tow of thr 
other, and that he procf'(>ded on his cours(> under the impres. 
sion that no damage had bren done. He reported the collisiol! 
to his employers, but not to the United States Steamboat 
Inspector. 
Plaintiff's damages consisted of expenses incurred in reo 
pairing his boat and replacing the engine and nets, and of 
loss of earnings. The jury's verdict was for only part of the 
Ilamages. iniijcating- that it fonnd both parties at fault. It 
was instructed to apply !'ection 292 (c) of the California Har-
bors and Navigation Codf', which provides that if both parties 
to 8 ship collision are at fault Hthe loss shall be equall~' 
d.ivid.ed, unless it appears that there was great disparity in 
fnnlt, in which case the loss shall be equitabl~Y apportioned." 
[1&] Plaintiff's claim arises from a collision on navigab]r 
waters of the United States and thus involves a maritime caus(> 
of action (Un'ited States v. Appa7achian Elec. Power 00., 311 
U.S. 377 [61 S.Ot. 291, 85 L.Ed. 243]), which in a federal 
... 
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court sitting as a court of admiralty would he determined ~JT1· 
der federal maritime law. (lrarinfl v. Clarke. 5 How. (46 U.S.) 
441, 459 [12 L.Ed. 2261: The Grnrswc Chicf v. Fitzhu{!h. 
12 How. (53 U.S.) 448 113 L.Bo. 10S,'<1 ; (hant Smith-Porier 
Ship Co. v. Rohde. 2m n.s. 450. 47G 142 set. 1 m, 66 L.Bo. 
3211 ; M rr1'fin v. 1r ('sf. 222 US., 01. 1 r\7 r 82 src 42. fiG TJ.J<;(l. 
1fifl1.) Thr fe(lrra 1 m:1ritime hny proviclrs for eC]l1fl] iliyision 
of damages. if both parties werr Ht frm11. eyrll tl10ugll tIl ere 
was a disp:1l'ity in ffll11t. (Thr 1I1m·ian. 6G P.2(1 3fi4; The Mar-
flaret. 30 P.2d fl23. 028 1lnd cases thrre r He-d.) .Tnrisilirtion 
of thr state court to try the action ir; bar;ed on section 24 (3) 
of the ,TuiliciaJ Code. 28 U.S.C.A. section 4] (3). which "in 
all ciyiJ cases of admiralty and maritime jurisrliction" saves 
to suitors "the right of a common law remedy where the 
common law is competent to give it." The remedy afforded 
in the state court may be invoked to secure such rights "as 
I'eadil~' admit of assertion and enforcement in actions in 
personam according to the course of the common Jaw." (Pan-
ama R. Co. v. Vasquez, 271 U.S. 557, 561 r 46 S.Ot. 596. 70 
L.Ed. 1085]; see Moore v. Purse Seine Net, 18 CaJ.2d 835. 
837 [118 P.2d 1] ; C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore. 318 P.8. 133 
[63 S.Ct. 499, 87L.Ed. 663].) Plaintiff's action is in personam 
to recover damages for tort and is "one of the most familiar 
of the common law remedies.;' (Pa.nama R. Co. v. Vasquez. 
supra.) "That there always has been a remedy at common 
law for damages by collision at sea cannot be deni,oo.'· 
(Schoonmaker v. Gt7more, 102 U.S. 118, 119 (26 L.Ed. 931.) 
Since contributory neglig-ence generally precludes a plaintiff 
from recovering damages at common law, defendant COll-
tends that the doctrine of contributory ne;','jigrnre il' part 
of the common-law remedy and is therefore binding on a 
state court in a maritime cause as a limitation of the court's 
jurisdiction. 
Defendant relies on Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674 [14 
S.Ct. 264, 37 L.Ed. 1218], in which the United States Supreme 
Court held that contributory negligence of the plaintiff would 
bar recovery in an action on a maritime collision in a state 
court. Other courts, including this court in an early decision, 
have reached the same conclusion. (Kelly v. Cunningham, 
1 Cal. 365, 367; Maleeny v. Standard Shipbuilding Corp., 
237 N.Y. 250 [142 N.E. 602] ; Smith v. Norfolk & S. R. Co., 
145 N.C. 98, 99 [58 S.E. 799, 122 Am.St.R€p. 423] ; Steiner 
v. Mississippi lliver etc. Co., 194 Iowa 647 [190 N.W. 9, 25 
May l!)~Gl I~TAGLIA'L\ I'. ;';ilJl'(JW;-';EWi S: ,\lElL ETC. CO. 371 
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_________ •• o_ -----------
A.I.l.R. ];);)lJ; Johnson v. l.nitcd Slate., 8hiZJ]!ing j;o({rd etc. 
Corp., 21 F.~d !J6:J; Puget Sound "'al·. Co. v. N(/::;on, 4] 
1<'.2.1 3;j(;: Wo1!rC)' \'. Electric Ferries Inc., 82 1<'.2<1 JO:2:{.! 
'l'h('s(' ('ourts have sometimes stated tlwt gCJl('rnl IJrineiple,., 
of In\\' \\'ouid rcqnire a di/'ferc'llt C'OlW]U,,,jOll. (In rc Pennsyl. 
vania R. J.'. {'o., 4t: P.2d 550, 566; 1filkins v. Foss Launch 
etc. Co., 20 \Yn.2d 422 [147 P:2d 5241 ; scc Sprague, Di"iderl 
Damages, G l\.Y.TT.L Rev. 14.i 
Suhscquent deeisions of the United States Supreme Court, 
howe\'cr, eompcl the cOllclusion that Belden v. Chase, SU1)ra, 
is no longer a binding precedent. Tbe sole basis for the hold-
ing in Belden v. Chase is a dictum in Atlec v. Northwestern 
U. Packet CQ., 21 Wall. (88 U.S.) 389, 395 [22 L.Ed. 619], 
that admiralty courts and common-l a,\' courts have their own 
set of rules for determining the effect of the fault of both 
parties in a collision case and that the applicability of either 
sets of rules depends on the forum selected by the plaintiff. 
Under this theory, the special rules of admiralty practice 
with respect not only to remedial but to substantive rights 
would apply only if the suit were brought in a court of 
admiralty. This theory has been repudiated in later cases. 
[2J It is now settled that "The general rules of the mari-
time law apply whether the proceeding be instituted in an 
admiralty or common law ('ourt." (Carlisle Packing Co. v. 
Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255, 259 [42 S.Ct. 475, 66 L.Ed. 927); 
Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 380-381 [38 
S.Ct. 50J, 62 L.Ed. 1171) ; HnickC1'bocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 
253 U.S. 149, 159 [40 S.Ct. 438, 64 L.Ed. 834, 11 A.L.R. 1145) ; 
Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33 [46 S.Ct. 410, 70 L.Ed. 
813) ; Panama R. Co. t'. Vasquez, 271 U.S. 557 [46 S.Ct. 596, 
70 L.Ed. 1085) ; Messel v. Foundation Co., 274 U.S. 427, 434 
[47 S.Ct. 695, 71 L.Ed. 1135]), and that the state courts must 
preserve all substantial admiralty rights of the litigants. 
(Garrett v. Moore-McConnack ('0., 317 U.S. 239, 249 [63 
S.Ct. 246, 87 L.Ed. 239) ; Messel v. Foundation Co., 274 U.S. 
427,434 [47 S.Ct. 695,71 L.Ed. 1135).) A state court having 
the same jurisdiction over a case that a federal court would 
have if the suit had been brought there, must determine the 
rights of the parties under the maritime law as a "system 
of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the 
whole countn-." (The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. (88 U.S.) 558, 
575 [22 L.Ed. 654]; Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 
) 
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u.s. 20;), 215 [37 S.Ct. 524, 61 L.Ed. lORG]; Chelcntis v. 
'~llcl"l'nl)ach S. S. Co., Sllpra, p. 382; [(nicker/locke?' lee CO. 
I. StCl{'arl,~53 U.S. 140, 15!) 140 S.C1. 438, 64 IJ.E(l. 834, 
11 A.L.R. 1145] ; Carlisle j'ackinu Cu. v. Sandangcr, 259 U.s.. 
~55, ~GU 142 S.Ct. 475, 6G L.Ed. 027); Mcssel v. FOUi/datioll 
Co., ~74 U.S. 427, 434 147 S.Ct. 605,71 hEd. 1135).) Stale 
law is ilwpplicable to a maritillll' cause "if it eontravenes 
the esselltial pur}JOOi(, expressed by an act of Congress or 
worb. material prejudice to the characteristic features of the 
general maritime law or interferes with the proper barmollY 
and uniformity of that law in its international and interstah' 
reJations." (Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 
216 [37 S.Ct. 524, 61 L.Ed. 1086 J; Occidental Ind. Co. v. 
Industrial Ace. Corn., 24 Ca1.2d 310. 313 [149 P.2d 841); 
Knickerbocker lee Co. v. Stewart, supra, p. 157.) Thus the 
common-law defense of assumption of risk is not available 
in either a state or federal court in a suit brought by a seaman 
under the Jones Act (41 Stats. 1007, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688; 
Paulsen v. McDuffie, 4 Ca1.2d 111, 115, 118 [47 P.2d 709) ; 
Beadle v. Spencer, 298 U.S. 124 [56 8.Ct. 712, 80 L.Rd. 
1082J; The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 [56 8.Ct. 707, 
80 L.Ed. 1075 J ), nor is contributory negligence a bar to plain-
tiff's recovery in such a suit. "Any rule of assumption of 
risk in admiralty, whatever its scope, must be applied in 
conjunction with the established admiralty doctrine of com-
parative negligence and in harmony with it. Under that 
doctrine contributory negligence, however gross, is not a bar 
to recovery but only mitigates damages." (Socony-Vacuum 
Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 431 [59 S.Ct. 262, 83 L.Ed. 
265]; Beadle v. Spencer, supra, p. 131.) Any doubt as to 
whether the foregoing cases or Belden v. Chase governs mari-
time causes in the state courts is dispelled by the Supreme 
Court's declaration in Garrett v. Moore-McCormack 00., supra, 
pages 244-245 that: "In many other cases this Court has 
declared the necessary dominance of admiralty principles in 
actions in vindication of rights arising from admiralty law. 
Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674 [14 S.Ct. 264, 37 L.Ed. 1218], 
an 1893 decision which respondent relies upon as establish-
ing a contrary rule, has never been thus considered in any of 
the later cases cited." 
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., supra, involved a suit 
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damages for iujur.) ulJueJ' tl1e' JUlIes Act aud for maintenanc.'C. 
and curl' unCler tIll" general Jl1l1ri1i11l(' law. With respect to 
both statutory aud the IlOllstat utor.\' eallse of action, th\' 
('OUIt heldcontrollillg the rule of the genera] maritime law 
with respect to the validity of a release of claims of a seamaTi 
against his master that "the responsihilit~; is on the defendl1l11 
to sllstain 11 releose rutile)' than 011 the plaintiff to o\'ereOllW 
it," and revers cd the statc court, which had appli r d tl,., 
I-ltate rule requirillg," proof hy the plaintiff beyond :1 j'C:l"on, 
able douLt. "The rig-ht of petitioner to be free from t1:" 
burden of proof imposed by the Pennsylvania local rule ill-
hered in his cause of action. Deeply rooted in admiralty ~IS 
that right is, it was a part of the very substance of his claim 
and cannot be considered a mere incident of a form of pro-
cedure." (P. 249.) In pronouncing the rule that state law 
cannot be applied in a maritime cause if it would substantiall~' 
impair a right arising unde'r federal maritime law, the court 
declared: "The source of the· governing law applied is in the 
national, not the state, governments. If by its practice the 
state court were permitted substantially to alter the rights of 
either litigant, as these rights were established in federal law, 
the remedy afforded by the state would not enforce, but would 
actually deny, federal rights which Congress, by providing 
alternative remedies, intended to make not less but more 
secure .. _ admiralty courts, when invoked to protect rights 
rooted in state law, endeavor to determine the issues in accord-
ance with the subst.antive law of the State. So here, in try-
ing this case the state court was bound to proceed in such man-
ner that all the substantive rights of the parties under control-
ling federal law would be protected." (P. 245.) 
[lb] There can be no doubt that the division-of-damages 
rule in maritime collision eases involving the fault of both 
parties is as binding on the state courts as the federal rule as 
to burden of proof with respect to the validity of releases in 
suits by seamen for maintenance and cure. The right of a 
plaintiff to a division of damages in a maritime collision case 
involving the fault of both parties is a substantial right deeply 
rooted in admiralty, inherent in his cause of action. and sueh 
a part of the substanee of his claim that it "cannot be consid-
ered a mere ineident of a form of procedure." It is indeed 
an essential and characteristic feature of the substantive law 
of admiralt~·. The very basis of the plaintiff's ennse of action, 
which is unquestionably a maritime cause 01 action, would be 
... 
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destl'vveo if recoycr\ \\"l:re dtllil'J lWl'1lUSC of hi:,; colJtributory 
lJeglig~llce, for it is ~],]y till,j"j admir<Jlty law that hc has allY 
claim for damagcs ~ll·jsilli! frO]ll a lIlal'itilile collisioll (',lUsed by 
lhe fault of uoth partie,... If the stille coul'l should ilJ.]!ly state 
lal\" rather thm) adllJiralty law "till' )Tll)cd.\" ;!floral'd by tll(, 
State would not ellforC"l' but would <Jetu:dly Jeny, federal 
rights which COllgr<css, by pl'oyiding aiteJ'llatiy(' remedies, in-
tCll(ktl to llIa](e )]ot l(·.~,.. 11111 morl' Sl·CUl"I.'.·· (O<llfrtt Y. Moore-
.1JcConnack Co., s"Upru, ]'. :2-E).) That thl' ullitpd States Su-
pl'eme Court l'egaros tilt plaintiff's right ill SUcll a casc as a 
substantial admiralty rigLt clearly appears 110t only from its 
abanoomncnt of Beldcn \'. Chase, but from its references in 
the Garrett case to state doctrines of contributory negligence 
and assumption of risk as doctrines that must give way to 
admiralty principles in actions at law OD maritime torts. 
"There is no dearth of example of the obligation on law 
courts which attempt to enforce substantive rights arii;ing 
from admiralty law to do so in 11 mallner conforming to ad-
miralty practice. Contributory negligence is not a barrier 
to a proceeding in admiralty 01' under the Jones Act, and the 
state courts are required to apply this rule in Jones Act ac-
tions. Beadle v. Spencer, 298 U.S. 124 [5G S.Ct. 712, 80 L.Ed. 
1082 J. SImilarly, state courts may not apply their doctrines 
of assumption of risk in actions arising under the Act. The 
Arizona v. A.nelich, 298 U.S. 110 [56 S.Ct. 707, 80 L.Ed. 
1075]; Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 [59 
S.Ct. 262, 83 L.Ed. 265]. State courts, whether or not apply~ 
ing the J olles Act to actions arising from maritime torts, have 
usually attempted, although not always with complete success, 
to apply admiralty principles. The federal courts, when 
treating maritime torts in actions at law rather than in suits 
in admiralty, have also sought to preserve admiralty princi-
ples whenever com-onant with the necessities of common law 
procedure." 
The court cited with approval (317 U.S. 239,244, note 8) 
Colonna Shipyard v. Bland, 150 Va. 349, 358 [143 S.E. 729, 
59 A.L.R. 491], as a state court decision applying federal 
maritime law with respect to the effect of contributory negli-
gence in an action on a maritime tort. In the Colonna Ship-
yard case a ship carpenter was injured through the negligence 
of his master. In denying defendant's right to defeat recov-
ery b~' the defense of contributory negligence, the Virginia 
Supremc Court of Appeals declared: ",\Yhen one suffers an 
• 
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injury ullder :mdl ('jn~U1llsl;IIIt'l!~ a,., to 1)(' " JIl;ll'iti.JJI(, tort, his 
righ~ are ftx('dLy til<' admii'allY ];1\\'; Il1lt he Ilwy choos(' lh(' 
forum in which t(i as;wl'l tlios(' l'i;:llls. 11(: has his J·cl)J(·dy at 
common Imy, bu1 Ids r(,(,()H'l'Y alld tht' )lr('eis(' relicr aironh·d 
him arc determincd by thr IIdllliJ';J11y 1(1";- wllif'h is 11I'Pli('d, 
whether he sues ill th(l COIIIIIIOIi Inw or tIl(' atl!niralty ('on1't. 
He may pursue his rl'lIl!'dy al common law ill 1he stat,· (·01l1·t, 
but that court must Mllllinistcr the adlJliralt~· law. lIe mny 
select his court, bnt CUlIIlnt add to or ciwngl' his l;i:~hts which 
are the same in both forums." (~('(', also, lln,ited StaffS v. 
Norfolk-Berkley Brid{J{' Cor]!., 2fl F.2d 115. 128.) A case 
holding that contributory negligence is not a bar to a proceed-
ing in admjralt~, would not be invoked by the United Stnles 
Supreme Court as an example of th(' obligation of law courts 
. to enforce substantive rig-hts arising from admiralt~' law in 
conformity with admiraJt~' practice, in support of its hold-
ing that the same principl(ls applied' to the burden. of proof 
in a maritime cause, if the court did not regard the. right to 
divided damages a sllhst:mtive right nrising from admiralty 
law. 
[3] Moreover, under accepted principles of contlict of 
laws the effeet of cont.ributor~· negligence is governed by the 
law under which the cause of action was acquired rather than 
b~' the law of the forum. (FitZlJat'rick v. International Ry. 
Co., 252 KY. 127, 134 [169 ~.E. 112, 68 A.L.R. 8011; Shaffer 
v. New l'ork Centml R. Co., 66 Ohio App. 417 [34 KE.2d 
792] ; Rest., Conflicts of Laws. § 385 ;2 Beale, Treatise on Con-
flict of Laws, § 385.1; 11 Am .• Jur. Contlict of Laws, § 189, 
p. 503; Robinson, Admiralty, 860.) "The constant obj('ctj\'e 
of legislation and jurisprudence is to ass.nre litigants full pro-
tection for all substantive rights intended to be affordrd b~' the 
jurisdiction in which the right itself originates. Not so long. 
ago we sought to achieve this re~m1t with J'espect to enforce-
ment in the federal courts of right!" created or governed by 
state law [Erie R. Co. v. Toml)liins, 304 n.s, 64 [5S R.Ct. R17, 
82 L.Ed. 1188. 114 A.L.R. 1487)1." (Garrett Y. Moore-Mc-
Cormack 00., supra, p. 245.) "The fact that a feileral right 
is to be ascertained in a stat(' rat.her than in a feoeral court 
does not make it any less the duty of the court to appl~' feo-
erallaw. Ohesapeake & O. R. 00. v. Jiartin, 283 n.S. 209, 212, 
213 [51 S.Ot. 453, 75 L.Ed. 983] ; Awotin v. Atlas Exchange 
Nat. Bank, 295 U.S. 209 f55 S.Ot. 674, 79 I,.Ed l~fI~l ; Rrad1/ 
'Y. Southern R. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 479 [64 S.Ot. 232, 88 L.Ed. 
... 
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2~:!'1 1111(1 ease, eifel]; nlilluis Sted ('0. v. T!,rl/imorc J: O. R. 
('0. :120 n.s. riO.'<. rill [fi·1 SCi. ~2:.!, RR LB,l 2ri!l1 a]1(l C:1Sf'S 
ritf'(]: 8lrrle v. /,Ov£S1Ji/1r & S. R. {,lo., ~2~ n.R. Ifl2 [firi S. 
Ct. 22fi. 8f! hEd. --1." (('hirr ,Tw·liee Stollr. f'oncurring 
in Pl'lir/('llN' r:('("i~(J!irJ1l COI'II v. P('rl'is, -- U.S. -- [firi 
S(:t. ri1!J. !i42, R!l L.Erl --1.) 
[4) Federal law gon'rns not only tlie conscqucllces of the 
f:llilt of tlil' THlrt irs Imt t lie (]llrsl ion Wllr>tll('r their vl'ssl'ls wet<' 
oprr;J1c(l ill eompli:lll('(" \\"ith fh,· rlll(,s gm'(Tnin.[T navig-ation on 
nayig::blr watl'rs of thr Pnil!'rl States. The Federal Inland 
Rnll's of Nadgalion. ~O Stats. %.102; (33 U.S.e.A. §~ 151.231) 
are controllin!! except as the~' permit the application of special 
lornl law. Plllintiff violatrd thr Frrlrral Inland Rules in sev-
eral respcC'ts. While hr was repairing his engine he failed 
to keep a lookout as I'r'lnirra h~' luti('l£' 2fl. ~o Stats. 102; 
33 U.S.C.A. section 22]. and was thus ullahle to see the tug 
and cllr float in time to avoid the ('ollision He gave no dan. 
gl'r signal as refjuired h~' artiell' 18. rule TTl, and instend of 
reducing his speed (Tlic PennSjll1·nnirl11. 139 F.2d 478. 48]) 
hr startrd his motor just hefore the ('olJision occurred. Al-
though he was outbound hr faill'd to keep to the starboard 
side of the channel. which the jun' must have re~arded as a. 
narrow one within the meaning of article 23. 30 Stats. 101; 
38 p.Ke.A., sertion 210 (The Bee, 138 F. ~O~ [70 C.C.A. 
!)fj3j: The Hok('.lIdnltr11W, 270 F. 270; 28 Words and Phrases, 
19.) Althoug'h he followed generalJ~' a westerly direction, 
hr failen to keep out of the wa~' of ol'frnormt's vessels, which 
followed an cnst b~' south direction and were therefore on his 
:ltarIJo:m'l sinr. (Art". lfl. 22. 2:i: 33 IT.S.C.A. ~& 204, 207, 
20R. ) 
Defendant contends tllllt it call be determined as a matter 
of law under the Federal Inland Rules that it was not negli-
~ent. The evidence show!' without conflict that defendant's 
vessels proceerled on their course as prescrihed by the rules 
aprlicable undrr ordinan' circumstanres. [5] The question 
remains, howewr. whether soml'time hefore the captnin of 
the "Sea Royer" gave the order to stop and reverse the ship, 
;1(' knew ot should have known that hf' could avoid a collision 
by stoppin~ his vessels, or b~' changing his course, for the 
rnles provide,. "I:i'! obeying and construing the1':(, rules <hlP 
regard shall he had to all dangers of nayif!!1tion and collision, 
lllld to nny speciii.l ('ircumsta~l('(,<; which may render a oe-
parture from the above rules necessary in oruer to avoiu im-
t 
I 
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mediate danger." (Art. 27, 30 Stats. 102; 33 U.S.C.A. § 212.) 
A case of "special circumstances" requiring action outsid(' 
the rules exists if the danger was manifest to the captain of 
tllr vessel fared with the problem of <Iepa rting from the rules 
"'''here tv,'O courses are open to a vessel, and particulnrly to 
the privilegrd vessrl, one to follow the presr['ihrd rules ann 
tIl<' other to depart from them, the duty is impcrative to ob· 
serve the rules, and to assume that an approaching vessrl will 
do likrwise, until after thr d,mger has hecome so manif!'st as 
to show that there is no proper r>llOice of judgment other than 
that of departing from the rules. Any other course would 
lead to confusion and be a most prolific source of accidents." 
(The Piankatank, 87 F.2d 806,810.) [6] Defendant's ves-
sels were the privileged vessels. for they were on the starboard 
side of the approaching vessel. (30 Stats. 101; 33 U.S.C.A. 
§ 204.) They had a outy under the Federal Inland Rules to 
hold their course and speed (30 Stats. 101,33 U.S.C.A; ~ 206). 
whije it was plaintiff's duty to keep out of their "tay. (30 
Stats. 101: 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 207. 208.) [7] The dech;ive ques-
tion, therefore, is when it became the duty of the captain of 
the "Sea Rover" to stop and reverse his ship or to change 
his course. "The preferred steamer will not be held in fault 
for maintaing her course and speed, so long as it is possible 
for the other to avoid her b~· porting, at least in the absence 
of some distinct indication that she is about to fail in her 
duty." (Wilson v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 276 U.S. 454, 462 
[48 S.Ct. 369, 72 L.Ed. 651].) "The privileged vessel is 
always in a diffi.cult situation. The rule is that she must keep 
her course and speed until it becomes apparent that the bur· 
dened vessel alone cannot avoid the collision." (The Boston 
Socony, 63 F.2d 246. 248.) In the present case the captain 
of the "Sea Rover" watched plaintiff's boat after it cleared 
Pier 45 of the San Francisco Harbor. Visibility was good 
There were indications that the fishing boat was in distress 
and that it would not follow navigation rules. Although the 
fishing boat showed running lights, it proceeded at a very 
slow speed, drifting with the ebb tide for about five or six 
minutes before the collision. The failure of the fishing boat 
to change her course or to answer the "Sea Rover's" signal 
that the latter was going to change her course indicated that 
plaintiff's boat was mismanaged or out of control, and that 
observance 'of the navigation rules by plaintiff was not to be 
expected. The jury could reasonably have concluded that the 
) 
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captain or the "Sea Rover" should. have known that a dan-
gerous situation was developing when its signal indieaiing a 
change of coun;p remained nnanswereo. and. thai t.he only 
safe proeedure was not to maintain his coursp and speed hut 
to stop and reverse the "Sea RO\'er" or to change his ('onrse 
at onee. "'rhe lesson that st(,:1111 vessels must stop their en-
gines in the presence of danger, or even of anticipatrn (l:mger, 
is a hard one to learn, but the failure to do so has been the 
cause of condemnation of so man~' vessels that it would seem 
that these repeat eo admonitions must ultimately have some 
effect. We cannot impress upon the masters of steamveSl'lels 
too insistently the necessity of caution in passing or crossing 
the course of other vessels ill constricted channels." (The 
New York, 175 U.S. 187, 207 [20 S.Ct. 67, 44 L.Ed. ]26].) 
The captain of the "Sea Rover" should have exercised par-
ticular caution, for he did not maintain a special lookout on 
his vessel as required by article 29 of the Federal Inland 
Rules. (30 Stat8. 102; 33 U.S.C.A. § 221.) A tug with a tow 
. does not comply with this rule simply because the officer in 
charge looks out from the pilot house. (City of Phi7adelphia 
v. Gavagnin. 62 F. 617, 618 [10 C.C.A. 5521; The Williams-
port, 74 F. 653, 655 [20 C.C.A. 585] ; Dahlmer v. Bay State 
etc. Co., 26 F.2d 603, 605.) [8] Moreover, the captain did 
not know where the lookout on the tow was located, although 
he had in tow a barge about 280 feet in length and 40 feet in 
width. Although ordinaril:v it is the duty of the other ship 
to make allowance for the encumbered state of a tug (Thr 
Edward Chilton, 27 F.2d 624. 625), the captain of a tug with 
a barge in tow must give consideration to the special danger 
connected with such a tug in deciding whether the situatioll 
was so dangerous that he should stop the tug. As stated in 
Marsden, Collisions at Sea, ninth edition, page 185: "In taking 
measures to avoid 8 third vessel a tug has to consider her 
tow; and a step that would be right, and take her clear, if he 
were unencumbered, may bring about a collision between her 
tow arid the ship which she herself has avoided." 
[9] Defendant attempts to meet these condsiderations by 
asserting that under the rule known as the "major and minor 
fault rule" anx reasonable doubt as to its negligence had to be 
resolved in its favor. The rule has recently been restated and 
its limitations defined as follows: "It is well settled law that 
'where fault on the part of one "essel is estnhlished by un-
contradicted testimony, and such fault is, of itself, sufficient 
) 
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to a(,(,Ollnt for the rlisn~t('r. it is not E'noll(!h for Ru('h VPRscl to 
raise a doubt ""ith rc!!n~rl to tl)(> niana~~elllP)lt of the other 
vessel. '],hc1'(, i~ some PI,(,~UJ11)tj0l1 I1t !Nl~I:J(lv('r~(' 10 its 
claim, and any reasomibl'e rlOllht with reg-nnl to the propriety 
of the· condlH't of such oth!'!' vessel should he resolved in its 
fayor.' A7rxandre ~. 'Machan (The r.ity of Nrw York I. Hl9:1. 
147 U.R. 72. 85 [13 8.Ct. 211. :17 LErl. 1<41 Arcord. Thp: Vic· 
tory (The Plymothion). 1897, 161< U.R 410. 42:1 [18 S.Ct. 
149. 42 L.Ed. 5]91; Thr Ludvi{J Ho7.berq. 11<9;;. ]57 n.S. fiO' 
[15 S.Ct. 477, 39 L.Eil. fi201: Thp ~C?lln ,C:imeon. 2 Cir .. 1933. 
63 F.2d 798. However. this court long ago saiil that this rule 
that whe .. e one vessel was guilt~· of gro!'s fa1Th.· thE' other iR 
presumed not to have been in fault, was artificial and mis-
leading unless very carefull? applied. The Admiral .c~chlell. 
1 Cir., 1904, 13] F. 433. 439, affirmed on rehearing, 1 Cir., 
1905, 142 F. 64, certiorari denied, sub. nom. Consolidation 
Coal Co. v. A.merican Mm? 8teamship Co., 1906, 20] U.S. 648 
r 26 80 Ct.. 762, 50 L.Ed. 9051. Even though the first vessel i~ 
grossl;;' at fault, a plain fault on the part of the other vessel 
is not excused. The Albert Dumois. 1900. 177 U.S. 240, 253 
[20 RCt. 595, 44 IJ.Ed. 751]; The Yamashita Kisen Kabu· 
shiki Kaisha v. McCormick Tnter .• c::. ,e::. Co .. 9 Cir., 1927, 20 F. 
2d 25; The San Simeon. supra." (Genera.l Seafords Oorp 
v. J. S. Packard Dredg. Co .. 120 F.2d 117, 119.) The major 
and minor fault rule must goive way to t.he wen·settled rule of 
maritime law that if one vessel. though correctly navigated 
some time before the collision. ('an perceive that a dangerous 
situation is developing through mismanagement of another 
vessel it becomes her dut;\' with an means at her disposal to 
prevent'the accident and that "the fault, and even the gross 
fault of one vessel. does not absolve t.he other from the use of 
such precaut.ions as good judgment and accomplished seaman· 
ship require." (The Albe.1'f Dumois, 177 U.S. 24Q, 253 [20 
S.Ct. 595, 44 L.Ed. 75]] ; The New York, 175 U.S. 187, 207 
r20 8. Ct. 67, 44 L.Ed. 1261: The Yamashita etc. Kaisha v. 
McCormick etc. 00., 20 F.2d 25, 27; The San Simeon, 63 F.2d 
798, 800; The Trim, 30 F,SuPP. 283; Genera'! Seafoods Oorp. 
v. J. S, Packard Dredg. Co., supra, p. 119; see Inland Rule~. 
nrticle 29, 30 Stats. 102; 33 U.S.C.A. § 221.) 
[10] Defendant contends that several instructions to tht> 
jury were prejudicially erroneous. It objects to eertain m· 
structions on the ground that they had no support in the evi-
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of confused signals by both vesscl~, ulthoug-h the e\·j,]cll('(' 1II1i-
formly showed that a11 si~nals wcre given hy the def('lvlnll1. 
The jury was instructeil as to the ohlig'ntion of n Y('ssel 10 
avoid risk of collision with vessels at rest, although plaintift"'s 
ves~e], since it moved ,,,ith thc ehh t.iile, was never at r('sl. 
The jury was instructed that "a custom to the contrary call-
not relleve a towing tug from the ]rg'nl duty to maintain a 
proper lookout," although defendant did not claim that ther~ 
was such a custom. T1H'!"C' instrm'tiom: o~ h~'T'otllf'ti('al fn('t~ 
were apt to be confusilJ~. 
[11] The jury was instructed that "a tug must keep a 
lookout at the bow of the tow alongside, where the tow projects 
beyond the tug. If in this case, you find from a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the tug failed to keep a lookou:t in 
the bow of the barge, and that such failure proximately caused 
. the collision then the defendant is 1iable." By instructing the 
jury that a lookout must be stationed at a particular place on 
the tow, the court invaded the province of the jury. There 
is no rule that the lookout must be stationed at a particular 
place; his station should be where he is in a "position best 
adapted to descry vessels approaching at the earlieRt mo-
ment." (Inland Rules, art. 29, 30 Stats. 102 j 33 U.S.C.A. 
§ 221; The Catalina, 95 F.2d 283. 285 j Puratich v. UrlitNl 
States, 126 F.2d 914, 916: St. John v. Paine, 10 How. (51 
If.S.) 557, 585 [13 L.Ed. 537] ; The Penns1}7t'ania, Fed.Cas., 
No. 10949; The A. P. Sidmore, 108 F. 972: The Patria, 92 F. 
411: Yamashita ('tr. KC!;s11'~ '" . ..,[("r;()r~"';r1,. rf ('. ('0., 20 F.~(l 
21), 29.\ 
[12] The fOl'liluia lW;lni,·,.J'; i. Hil re."ipl·<:' to tilll effect of 
the disabled condition of plaintiff's vessel was not erroneons 
in omitting the element of contributory negligence, for the 
"easons given above j but it was incomplete in omitting all~" 
reference to plaintiff's duty to indicate the disabled status of 
his vessel by giving danger signals or other distress sl~nls. 
(30 Sta1.s. 100, 102: 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 203,231.) 
[13] Defendant also atacks the following instructiolJ: 
"Whenflver a collision between two vessels takes place, it is 
the duty of the master 01' person in charge of each vessel, so 
far as consistent with safety, to stay by the other to ascertain 
if she is in need of assistance, and render such aid as may b(' 
requisite and give the name and port of the vessel. Failur(' 
to do this, without reasonable cause shown, may raise a pre-
sumption that the collision was caused by his wrongful act, 
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n<eglect, or default. The fact that a vessel, apprised of the 
collision, goes 011 without any attempt to render assistancc 
is to OC l'l:ganlco as a suspiciom eircumstance." This instru('< 
tion was oased on section 367 of 33 U.S.C.A., 26 Stats. 42;;. 
w11 iell pro\" i,ics that 11110e1' the circumstances deseribe.1 in till' 
il1stnlC'jioll, it is the duty of the master ofeaeh vessel "to rc]]< 
der to tllc other ycsscl, her master, crew, and passengers (if 
allY) sneh. assistance as may be practica ble and as may be 
necessary in order to save them from any danger caused by 
the collision, and also to give to the master or person in charge 
of the other vessel the name of his own vessel and her port of 
registry .... If he fails so to do, and no reasonable cause 
for such failure is shown, the collision shall in the absence of 
proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been caused by his 
wrongful act, neglect or default." The instruction provides 
that a vesesl shall "render such aid as may be requisite" 
whereas the statute provides that the vessel shall render 
"such assistance as may be practicable and as maybe neces~ 
sary." Although "requisite" may be the fair equivalent of 
"necessary," it is not the equivalent of "practicable," for it 
may not be "practicable" to render the necessary aid. The 
instruction also omitted the condition, "in the absence of 
proof to the contrary." These omissions rendered the instruc-
tion incomplete. 
[14] The court gave the following instruction: "The fact 
that a tug is burdened with a heavy and unwieldy tow im-
poses on the tug the duty of taking extraordinary care to keep 
her tow out of the way of other vessels." There is no such 
rule. It is established that as between vessels otherwise equal, 
a tug with a tow has the right of way over a vessel without a 
tow. (The Edward Ohilton, 27 F.2d 624, 625.) The cumu-
lative effect of the foregoing instructions and those considered 
below was to confuse the jury as to the real issues ane the law 
governing the duties of vessels at sea. 
[15] The instructions were conflicting on substantial mat-
ters. On the question as to the proper conduct of vessels 
approaching on crossing courses, the jury was instructed in 
terms of section 284 of the California Harbors and Navigation 
Code: "When steam vessels will inevitably or necessarily 
cross so near that by continuing their respective courses there 
would be risk of collision, each shall give right rudder, 80 as 
always to pass on the port or left side of the other." On the 
same question the jury was also instructed in the terms of the 
) 
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Federal Inland Rules (30 8tats. 1()] ; 38 IT.S.(;.A. §§ 204, 20'7, 
208) that "When two stealn vessels an: crossini'. so as to in-
\'olve risk of rollision, the vessel wliirh has tIle othr)' on he)' 
starhoard or right side shrill keC]1 out of tIJ(' way of the 01her." 
"Ever,\' vessel whirh is (li)'('('j('!l h." tli('se' rule'S to ke0]l 11111 of 
the way of another vessel. shall. if the' rircuJlIstan('es of the 
case admit, avoid crossing' ahcnd of tIJ(· otl]('I'." "Every steam 
vessel whirh is direrte<l by these rules to keep out of t.he 
way of alwtiJer vessel shall. on approa0hing her, if neeessary 
slacken her speed or reyerse." The giving of conflirting in-
structions on this vital issue was prejudicial error. (Pipo7y 
v. Benson. 20 CaJ.2d 366, 369 [125 P.2d 482,147 A.L.R. 5]1)1 ; 
Pittam v. Cit1! of Riverside. 128 CaJ.App. 57 [16 P.2d 7681 : 
Torvend v. Patterson, 136 (;al.App. 120, ]24 [28 P.2d 4131.) 
Moreover, the instruction under the California code section 
. was in itself erroneous, for till' federal rules are paramount. 
In the light of the evidence in this case we cannot say that it 
is improbahle that the jlll'~' found defendant negligent because 
it failed to give rig-hI rudder in accordance with the Califor-
nia code section. [16] Furthermore. the instruction on the 
applicable federa I rlllr~ was incomplete, for the court refused 
to give an instruction requested by defendant based on the 
Federal Inland Rules (30 Stats. 101; 33 n.S.C.A. § 206) that 
"where by any of these rules, one of the two vessels is to keep 
out of the way, the other shall keep her course and speed." 
The pivotal qnestion in the case is whether the captain of the 
"Sea Rover" should have stopped and reversed the tug or 
changed his course in time to prevent an otherwise inevitable 
collision. The jury had to be properly instructed with respect 
to the captain's dnties in this regard before it could determine 
the question of his negligence. The faiJure of the court to in-
struct the jury that the "Sea Rover" had to maintain her 
course and speed until the danger of collision became manifest, 
and was then under a duty to take all reasonable action to 
prevent a collision, Jeft the jury without the governing stand-
ard by which to measure defendant's negligence. While we 
cannot say as a matter of law under the evidence in this case 
that· a reasonable jury could not conclude that the captain 
of the "Sea Rover" failed to stop and reverse the tug or to 
change his course after the danger of collision became mani-
fest and in time to avoid the collision, neither can we say it 
is improbable that under proper instructions the jury would 
have reached a different conclusion. 
.... 
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'l'hc judgment is reversed and the appeal from the ordl'}" 
den~'in~ thr motion for nl'w trill] is dismissrcl. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and 
Spence, .1., conrurred. 
::;CllAUER, J.~l coneur in the judgment. I agree with the 
holding of the majority opinion that till' feuenil maritime Jaw 
governs the caUSe 01' action and that the cvidence is not in-
sufficient, as a matter of law, to support a fillding of negligence 
on the part of plaintiff as well as on that of the operator of 
defendant's tugboat. Where both vessels are at fault the 
damages are to be equally divided, irrespective of the degree· 
of fault. (The Marian (1933), ·66 F.2d 354, 357.) Since the 
damages were not equally divided here but were apparently 
assessed upon the theory of apportioning the loss in accord-
ance with the fault, the judgment must be reversed. 
Both plaint.iff's and defendant's vessels were under way at 
all times concerned (see Preliminary Definitions, paragraph I, 
Inland Rules) but there is a coriflict in the evidence as to 
whether, up to a few moments before the collision, plaintiff's 
vessel was under command and was making way through the 
water. According to plaintiff his boat had not been under 
command and had not been making way through the water 
for some five or six minutes prior to the time when the barge 
had approached within 25 or 30 feet of him. But the master 
ofdt'fendant's tug testified that he had watched plaintiff con-
tinuously during the closing of a gap of at least one-quarter 
of a mile; that plaintiff had "held his course and speed"; 
that before the' collision the tug with its tow had lost way 
completely and that it was plaintiff's boat which ran into the 
barge. 
Regardless of all other rules which may have been involved 
it is obvious that plaintiff could be found, either upon his own 
testimony or upon that of defendant's master, to have been 
guilt~· of negligence in failing to keep a proper lookout for 
approaching veRSels. Likewise upon the testimony of either 
plaintiff or the tug's master it could be found that the latter 
was inattentive or unskillful or otherwise negligent in brin~­
ing his cumbersome and unwieldy tow so close to plaintiff's 
boat as to involve imm~diate risk of collision under any of the 
circumstances shown. If plaintiff's boat was not under com-
mand that fact should have been apparent to an expel'ienced, 
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COllljlctent. ancl att,PlltiYC' oni"('r in lhe ]li1nl hom;!' or dd('llli· 
ant's tug' ill ample til1lc to 11:I\'C' )H'J'lilit!!'<l lI\'oi<l:inrp or lhC' 
('.olJisioll and if, on tbl' Ot!I(']' hilll<l. pl:lii11itl"s IHI:ll was und('!' 
('ommand and makjn(~' way tlll'(ill~rh 1111' water tlH'llit wOllle! 
seent to b(' a rc,asonnhlp inf('!'('ilrc tlnlt lh(' Illaslp), of tll(' tng 
was npgligent in not" IwyillQ SO()]II')' rI'(·oglliz!'d. or :1(>1('(1 11]1011 
the fact, that risk of collision was invol\'f~d ill the Ilol(liwf of 
course and speed b? holh the tow and pl:1intiff"~ hon1 afl('l' the 
latter hna fnil('d to answer a crossin/! signal wldrll cnllea' for 
it to cross thpbow of thC' tow from slnrho~r(l topo)'t :lna \\"hpr(' 
its compass bearing r('main('rl constant. . 
I do not sec how the instruction qnoting section 284 of the 
California Harbors and Navigation Code could l)Ossihly hnv(' 
pre.ludiced the defendant. According to the master of de-
fendant's tugboat he sounde>d one blast of tIw whistle> calling 
for each boat to alter her course to starboard and to leave the 
other to port. This is in ac('ordwith the Californill code> rnle 
as well as with rule I of article 1& of the Inland Rules, It 
does not necessarily appear, howen~r, that thE' situl1tion was 
controlled by snch rule I. 
Rule I of article 18 applies to passing vessels, t.hat is, to 
ves('ls "approaching each other ritalics added] head and 
head .... or nearly so .... It does not apply by day to cases 
in which a vessel sees anot.her ahead crossing her own course, 
or b~' night" where the same relative positions are shown by 
the running lights. It waf': the latter situation which aImost 
certainly was present here. Plaintiff's boat was coming from 
Fisherman's Wharf. from the vicinity of Pier 45. Defend-
:mt'8 tow WllS coming from Tiburon on a ('.011rs(' to dock at 
Pier 45 against an' ebh tide. Ne('essaril~', until they had 
crossed, plaintiff's boat was to starboard of defendant's tug 
and barge, and, as was to be expected, that is where t.he mast.er 
of the tug said that he first saw plaintiff's boat. He said t.hat 
he saw several fishing hoats on his starboard side, "well in-
side, towardf': Aquatic Park" and that plaintiff's boat was 
one of two which "steered in such' a direction as to cross my 
bow," At that time a distance of about one-half mile sepa-
rated plaintiff:s boat and defendant's tow. Plaintiff under 
article 19 (Inland Rules) had the right of way. "When two 
steam vessels [under the statutory definition both plaintiff's 
boat and Of'fpnollnt'f': tug w('re "!"1(,11m Y!?s!"cls"] are crossing, 
80 as tQ involve risk of collision, the vessel which has the 
) 
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otli,'1' Oll her starboard side shall keep ont of thr wa~: of 
tIl(' ot "<'r." 
APP::I'('lltly, it was at ahont tIl(' t.illH' that l,lnilltiff\ boat 
rI'Heli('d a position nearJ~' drncl ahr;l!l of tlip to\\· tll:lt plain-
tiO'" PJlgint' stO]lJICCl. Either his enVille ,;t(Jpp,·(l or h(· n11r)'l·<I 
his eon!'s" fJ'om a el'()s.~jll/! C()llJ'S~ to a P:ISSill!! '·Plll'SI'. In pitli,'r 
en'llt it is OI"'JOllS tila! liis 11llglc on tlif' ho\\' of dl'f"ll,lnllt'S 
craft ccascd to cll'I.W!" and thr }lJ'l'lil!linnry provision of the 
Strcring and Sailin~' lilllrs Iwt':lllll' 111.plienhlr'. 1'hnt. provi~ion 
is Onland Rulrs .. ~ nT) : "Ri~k of collisioll CHll, when riremn-
stanees permit.. hf' ascf'l'tninro hy cl11'dully watching tlH' com-
pass bearing of an approaching vrssrl. If the hC'aring does 
not appreciahl~' change, such risk should 1)(' df'emed to rxiRt" 
1'111' mastC'r of the tug apparently recogniz('(lthis risk when t}.~ 
boats were ahont one-ql1nrtC'r milC' from each other. He teR-
tified that he first signnlerl the fi~hing boat wh(>n the~' were 
"a good quarter of a milC''' apart. HE' said. "When J saw 
that he had not altereo his courSC' r apparentl~' meaning com-
pass bearing], when I hlew this on(> whistle. then naturaBy 
I gave orders to the me>ll to come to th(> right." 
'fhe one blast of the>. whistle called for plaintiff to cross 
the bow of defendant's tow so that th(> vessels would cross 
or pas~ port to port. ThAt signal was not answered. The 
failure to answer it, coupl(>d with no change in compas bear-
ing, should at once ha"e been recognizC'o as evidencing "risk 
of collision." Prompt action by defendant's master, At the 
distance then separating the yesse!s. it would seem, could have 
averted the collision. 
Althougll eertain instructioIls were erroneous I do not be-
lieve that any of the instructions complained of were preju-
dicially erroneous except In so far as they authorized the jury 
to equitably apportion the loss if the~' found "that there was 
a great disparit~, in fault." As it is obvious that the jury 
did undert.ake t.o equitably apportion the loss the judgment 
cannot stand. 
For the above stated reasons only I concur in the judgment 
of reversal. ' 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was dellied June 21, 
1945. 
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